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Abstract
In this paper, algorithms for multivariate public key cryptography
and digital signature are described. Plain messages and encrypted mes-
sages are arrays, consisting of elements from a fixed finite ring or field.
The encryption and decryption algorithms are based on multivariate
mappings. The security of the private key depends on the difficulty of
solving a system of parametric simultaneous multivariate equations in-
volving polynomial or exponential mappings. The method is a general
purpose utility for most data encryption, digital certificate or digital
signature applications. For security protocols of the application layer
level in the OSI model, the methods described in this paper are useful.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminary Discussion
The role of cryptographic algorithms is to provide information security [[9],
[28], [42], [44], [45] and [46]]. In general, proper data encryption and authen-
tication mechanisms with access control are preferred for a trusted secure
system [[44] and [45]]. The most popular public key cryptosystems are the
RSA [[41]], NTRU [[21], [22], [23] and [24]], ECC [[27], [37], [43] and [48]],
the algorithms based on diophantine equations [[33]] and discrete logarithms
[[15]], and those based on multivariate quadratic polynomials [[6] and [29]].
The RSA, the NTRU and the ECC are assumed to be secure algorithms un-
less there are new breakthroughs in integer factoring (for RSA), or in lattice
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reduction (for NTRU), or in elliptic curve discrete logarithm techniques (for
ECC) [[11] and [19]].
In this paper, algorithms for public key cryptography as well as digital
signature based on multivariate mappings are described, with plain and
encrypted message arrays consisting of elements from a fixed commutative
and finite ring or field. The keys can be built up starting from independently
chosen small degree polynomial or easy exponential mappings, resulting in
fast key generation and facilitating easy changes of keys as often as required.
The security depends on the difficulty of solving parametric simultaneous
multivariate equations involving polynomial or exponential mappings [[8],
[10], [16], [17], [35], [36], [12] and [14]] in the case of straightforward attacks,
and on the difficulty of finding the private keys in the case of key recovery
attacks. For security protocols of the application layer level in the OSI
model, the methods described in this paper are useful.
1.2 Notation
In the sequel, let Z be the set of integers, and let N be the set of positive
integers. For a positive integer n ≥ 2, let Z
n
be the ring of integers with
addition and multiplication mod n, and Z∗
n
be the commutative group of
invertible elements in Z
n
, with respect to multiplication operation in Z
n
. The
representing elements in Z
n
are taken to be those from the set {0, . . . , n −
1} ⊆ Z. Let F be a finite field, consisting of pn elements for some positive
integer n and prime number p, and let F∗ be the multiplicative group of
nonzero elements in F. Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n ≥ 2. Let E
be either F or Z
n
or G. If E = G, where G is equipped with only the group
operation, then G is isomorphic to Z
n
, where the group operation in G is
identified with the addition operation of Z
n
. The addition operation of Z is a
primary operation, and the multiplication operation, that can be treated as
a secondary operation [[34]] over the additive group Z, is defined uniquely
by the distribution laws, with 1 as the multiplicative identity, rendering
Z as the commutative ring. The same holds for Z
n
, with 1 acting as the
multiplicative identity. Let E[x1 , . . . , xm ], for m ∈ N, be the algebra of
multivariate polynomials inm formal variables x1 , . . . , xm with coefficients in
E. Now, if G = F∗, for a finite field F, then the group operation in G coincides
with the multiplication operation in F and G[x1 , . . . , xm ] = F[x1 , . . . , xm ]. If
m = 1, then E[x1 , . . . , xm ] is denoted by E[x], with x = x1 . A variable with
its name expressed in bold face assumes values from a product space, which
is a product of finitely many copies of the same set, and each component
of the variable, expressed in the corresponding case without boldness and a
positive integer subscript, assumes values from the constituent component
space, succinctly as, for example, x = (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ E
m, for some m ∈ N.
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1.3 Polynomials over Z
n
Let n =
∏r
i=1 p
l
i
i , where r and li are positive integers, and pi are distinct
prime numbers, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Let q
i
= p
−l
i
i n =
∏r
j = 1
j 6= i
p
l
j
j , and let mi ∈ N
be such that m
i
q
i
≡ 1 mod p
l
i
i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, Zn = ⊕
r
i=1miqiZ
p
l
i
i
.
Now, a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z
n
[x] can be expressed as
∑r
i=1miqifi(x),
for some unique polynomials f
i
(x) ∈ Z
p
l
i
i
[x], for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. For some
x ∈ Z and index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, if p
i
| f(x), then gcd
(
f(x) mod p
l
i
i , pi
)
= gcd
(
f
i
(x) , p
i
)
= p
i
6= 1. Thus, gcd(f(x), n) = 1, for every x ∈ Z
n
, if
and only if gcd(f
i
(x), p
i
) = 1, for every x ∈ Z
p
l
i
i
, for every index i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Similarly, f is a surjective (hence bijective) mapping from Z
n
onto Z
n
, if and only if f
i
is a surjective (hence bijective) mapping from Z
p
l
i
i
onto Z
p
l
i
i
, or equivalently, f
i
(x) mod p
i
is a bijective mapping from Z
p
i
into
itself and, when l
i
≥ 2, f ′
i
(x) 6≡ 0 mod p
i
, for all x ∈ Z
p
l
i
i
, where f ′
i
is the
formal algebraic derivative of f
i
, for every index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r [[31]].
Now, if g(x) ∈ Z
n
[x], where g(x) =
∑r
i=1miqigi(x), for some gi(x) ∈ Z
p
l
i
i
[x],
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then f(x)g(x) =
∑r
i=1miqifi(x)gi(x). Thus, (A) f(x) is a
unit in Z
n
[x], if and only if f
i
(x) is a unit, i.e., f
i
(x) mod p
i
∈ Z∗
p
i
, for
every index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, (B) f(x) is reducible in Z
n
[x], if and only
if f
i
(x) is reducible in Z
p
l
i
i
[x], for some index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and (C)
f(x) is irreducible in Z
n
[x], if and only if f
i
(x) is irreducible in Z
p
l
i
i
[x], or
equivalently, f
i
(x) mod p
i
is irreducible in Z
p
i
[x], for every index i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Thus, for any positive integer k, Z
n
[x1 , . . . , xk ] can be expressed
as ⊕ri=1miqiZ
p
l
i
i
[x1 , . . . , xk ].
1.4 Modular Exponentiation over Z
n
The modular exponentiation operation is extensively studied in connection
with the RSA cryptosystem [[9], [28], [41], [42], [44], [45] and [46]]. In this
section, the modular exponentiation is extended to the situation, wherein
the exponents are functions. The security of the RSA system depends on the
difficulty of factorization of a positive integer into its prime factors. However,
simplification of computations as well as porting of variables from base level
to exponentiation level by a homomorphism requires availability of prime
factors in advance for both encryption and decryption, while working with
multivariate mappings involving functions as exponents. In the sequel, let
ϕ be Euler phi or totient function [[9], [28], [42] and [46]]. Let n =
∏r
i=1 p
l
i
i ,
4
where r ∈ N, l
i
∈ N\{1} and p
i
are distinct prime numbers, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Let EXP
(
Z
n
; [x1 , . . . , xm ]
)
be the smallest set of expressions, closed with
respect to addition and multiplication, and containing expressions of the
form a(x1 , . . . , xm)
b(x1 , ..., xm ), where a(x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ Zn [x1 , . . . , xm ], and
either
1. as a formal expression, b(x1 , . . . , xm) does not depend on (x1 , . . . , xm)
and evaluates to any fixed positive integer, or
2. a(x1 , . . . , xm) evaluates to elements in Z
∗
n
, for all values of (x1 , . . . , xm)
in some domain of interest, which is a subset of Zm
n
, and b(x1 , . . . , xm)
is of the form c(h(x1), . . . , h(xm)), for some expression c(z1 , . . . , zm)
∈ EXP
(
Z
ϕ(n)
; [z1 , . . . , zm ]
)
and ring homomorphism h from Z
n
into
Z
ϕ(n)
.
The condition in (1) above implies that Z
n
[x
1
, . . . , x
m
] ⊆ EXP
(
Z
n
; [x
1
, . . . , x
m
]
)
.
Thus, the integers in Z and those in Z
n
, for various modulus positive integers
n ≥ 2, need to be distinguished clearly as separate elements. The expres-
sions in EXP
(
Z
n
; [x1 , . . . , xm ]
)
are turned into mappings, by identifying
appropriate domains of values and interpretation for variables and opera-
tions in the respective domains [[12], [14], [34] and [35]]. For x ∈ Zm
n
and
s ∈ N\{1}, such that s | n, let x mod s =
(
x1 mod s, . . . , xm mod s
)
. Let
f(x) ∈ Z
n
[x1 , . . . , xm ] be such that f(x) evaluates to elements in Z
∗
n
, for x ∈
X, for some X ⊆ Zm
n
, and let f
i
(x) ∈ Z
p
l
i
i
[x1 , . . . , xm ], for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, be such
that f(x) =
∑r
i=1miqifi(x mod p
l
i
i ). Now, for x ∈ X and k ∈ Z, the follow-
ing holds:
(
f(x)
)k
=
(
f(x)
)k mod ϕ(n)
=
∑r
i=1miqi
(
f
i
(x mod p
l
i
i )
)k mod ϕ(n)
=
∑r
i=1miqi
(
f
i
(x mod p
l
i
i )
)k mod ϕ(plii ). Let g(y) ∈ Z
ϕ(Z
n
)
[y1 , . . . , yn ] and
g
i
(z) ∈ Z
ϕ(p
l
i
i
)
[z1 , . . . , zn ] be such that the following holds: gi
(
y mod ϕ(p
l
i
i )
)
=
g(y) mod ϕ
(
p
l
i
i
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Thus, f g(y)(x) =
∑r
i=1miqif
g(y)
i
(x) =∑r
i=1miqif
g
i
(y mod ϕ(p
l
i
i ))
i (x mod p
l
i
i ), for independent vectors x ∈ X and
y ∈ Zn
ϕ(n)
. Now, ϕ(p
l
i
i ) = (pi − 1)p
l
i
−1
i , where li ≥ 2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Let
w
i
= (p
i
− 1)−1 mod p
l
i
−1
i , and let hi : Z
p
l
i
i
→ Z
ϕ(p
l
i
i
)
be the map defined by
h
i
(x) = (p
i
− 1)(w
i
x mod p
l
i
−1
i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, hi is a ring homomor-
phism, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Now, let h
(∑r
i=1miqizi
)
=
(
h1(z1), . . . , hr(zr )
)
, for
z
i
∈ Z
p
l
i
i
and 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, the map h is a ring homomorphism from the
ring ⊕ri=1miqiZ
p
l
i
i
into the ring of direct product
∏r
i=1 Z
ϕ(p
l
i
i
)
. If the base
level and exponentiation level interpretation maps are I
base
and Iexponent,
respectively, then Iexponent can be chosen to be h ◦ Ibase , applied from right
to left in the written order, preserving the respective ring operations in the
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base level and exponentiation level subexpressions. If l
i
= 1, for some in-
dex i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then exponentiation along ith component can be
carried by interpreting Z
p
i
to be a finite field, and porting values of base
level expressions to exponentiation level expressions by discrete logarithm
mapping, as discussed in section 1.5.
1.5 Modular Exponentiation over F
Let F be a finite field containing pn elements and n = pn − 1, for some
prime number p and positive integer n. Let EXP
(
F ; [x1 , . . . , xm ]
)
be the
smallest set of expressions, closed with respect to addition and multiplica-
tion, and containing expressions of the form a(x1 , . . . , xm)
b(x1 , ..., xm ), where
a(x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ F[x1 , . . . , xm ], and either
1. as a formal expression, b(x1 , . . . , xm) does not depend on (x1 , . . . , xm)
and evaluates to any fixed positive integer, or
2. a(x1 , . . . , xm) evaluates to elements in F
∗, for all values of (x1 , . . . , xm)
in some domain of interest, which is a subset of Gm, where G = F∗, and
b(x1 , . . . , xm) is of the form c(h(x1), . . . , h(xm)), for some expression
c(z
1
, . . . , z
m
) ∈ EXP
(
Z
n
; [z
1
, . . . , z
m
]
)
and group isomorphism h from G
into Z
n
.
The condition in (1) above implies that F[x1 , . . . , xm ] ⊆ EXP
(
F ; [x1 , . . . , xm ]
)
.
For a primitive element a ∈ F∗, let log
a
: F∗ → Z
n
be the discrete logarithm
function defined by log
a
(g) = x, exactly when ax = g, for g ∈ F∗ and
x ∈ Z
n
. Thus, the group homomorphism h can be taken to be log
a
. If
the base level and exponentiation level interpretation maps are I
base
and
Iexponent , respectively, then Iexponent can be chosen to be loga ◦ Ibase , applied
from right to left in the written order. For porting a subexpression involving
addition operation in F, such as, for example, f(x) ∈ F[x1 , . . . , xm ], where
f(x) 6= 0, for x ∈ Gm, where G = F∗, occurring in a base level expression
to an exponentiation level, the base level subexpression is replaced by a
supplementary variable z, which is ported to first exponentiation level by the
discrete logarithm mapping. In the subsequent levels of exponentiation, the
interpretation is performed by applying ring homomorphisms, as discussed
in section 1.4.
2 Main Results
2.1 Parametric Injective Mappings
Let E be either F or Z
n
. Let G ⊆ E be the domain of interpretation for
the variables occurring in the mappings. For l ∈ {0} ∪ N and m ∈ N, a
parametric multivariate injective mapping η
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; (x1 , . . . , xm)
)
from
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Gm into Em is a multivariate injective mapping, which is an expression from
either E[x
1
, . . . , x
m
, z
1
, . . . , z
l
] or EXP
(
E ; [x
1
, . . . , x
m
, z
1
, . . . , z
l
]
)
with inter-
pretation conventions as discussed in sections 1.4 and 1.5, as appropriate,
for (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ G
m and (z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ Z ⊆ E
l, and its parametric inverse
η−1
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; (y1 , . . . , ym)
)
is such that, for every fixed (z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ Z,
the following holds: if η
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; (x1 , . . . , xm)
)
= (y1 , . . . , ym), then
(x1 , . . . , xm) = η
−1
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; (y1 , . . . , ym)
)
, for every (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ G
m
and (y1 , . . . , ym) ∈ E
m. For example, let n be the set cardinality of G =
F
∗, a ∈ F∗ be a fixed primitive element, which is made known in the
public key, and η
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
= f(z1 , . . . , zl)x
g(log
a
(z1 ), ..., loga (zl )), where
f(z
1
, . . . , z
l
) ∈ EXP
(
F ; [z
1
, . . . , z
l
]
)
and g(t
1
, . . . , t
l
) ∈ EXP
(
Z
n
; [t
1
, . . . , t
l
]
)
are such that f(z
1
, . . . , z
l
) 6= 0, for z
1
, . . . , z
l
∈ F∗, and gcd
(
g(t
1
, . . . , t
l
), n) =
1, for t
1
, . . . , t
l
∈ Z
n
. Then, η
(
z
1
, . . . , z
l
; x
)
is a parametric bijective mapping
from F∗ into F∗, with z1 , . . . , zl ∈ F
∗ as parameters, and the inverse mapping
of η is η−1
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
= [ [f(z1 , . . . , zl)]
−1x ][ [g(loga (z1), ..., loga (zl))]
−1
mod n ].
For the multivariate surjective mappings for digital signature scheme dis-
cussed at the end of section 3, mappings f(z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ EXP
(
F ; [z1 , . . . , zl ]
)
and g(t
1
, . . . , t
l
) ∈ EXP
(
Z
n
; [t
1
, . . . , t
l
]
)
can be chosen, such that both the
conditions f(z
1
, . . . , z
l
) 6= 0 and gcd
(
g(log
a
(z
1
), . . . , log
a
(z
l
)), n) = 1, simul-
taneously hold for (z
1
, . . . , z
l
) ∈ Z ⊆ Gl, where the required exact domain
Z 6= ∅ is a private key and known only to the signer.
2.1.1 Parametrization Methods
Let, for some positive integers k, l and m, g
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, be
a partition of unity of El, i.e.,
∑k
i=1 gi
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
= 1 and g
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
·
g
j
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
= 0, i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, for every
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
∈ El. The par-
tition of unity required for the parametric mappings discussed of this section
need not necessarily be strict, and it is possible that, for some i, where 1 ≤
i ≤ k, g
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
= 0, for every
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
∈ El. Let ζ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
,
1 ≤ i ≤ k, x = (x1 , . . . , xm), be parametric multivariate injective mappings
from Gm into Em, that may or may not depend on the parameters z1 , . . . , zl .
The vectors x and ζ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are identified with the cor-
responding m× 1 column vectors, whose j-th row entry is the j-th element,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, for allowing them to become amenable to matrix operations.
Let φ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
be an m×m matrix, and χ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
bem×1 vectors,
both with multivariate expressions as entries, such that φ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
eval-
uates to an invertible matrix, for every
(
z1 , . . . , zl
)
∈ El and 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Then, the expression η(z
1
, . . . , z
l
; x) =
∑k
i=1 gi(z1 , . . . , zl) · φi(z1 , . . . , zl) ·
[ζ
i
(z
1
, . . . , z
l
; x) + χ
i
(z
1
, . . . , z
l
)] is a parametric multivariate injective map-
ping, with its parametric inverse η−1(z
1
, . . . , z
l
; y) =
∑k
i=1 gi(z1 , . . . , zl) ·
ζ−1
i
(z
1
, . . . , z
l
; x
i
) , where x
i
=
[
[φ
i
(z
1
, . . . , z
l
)]−1 · y
]
− χ
i
(z
1
, . . . , z
l
), y =
(y
1
, . . . , y
m
), which is also identified with the corresponding m × 1 col-
umn vector, and [φi(z1 , . . . , zl)]
−1 is the matrix inverse of [φi(z1 , . . . , zl)],
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
For the multivariate surjective mappings for digital signature scheme
discussed at the end of section 3, it is possible to choose ζ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
to
be bijective, only for some indexes i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, letting it be arbitrary
for the remaining indexes. Since the domain information is a private key,
as discussed in the last paragraph of the preceding section, the updates
mentioned here must be so chosen that the effective domain will become
feasible, while maintaining it as a private key.
2.1.2 Partition of Unity of F
Let f(z) ∈ EXP
(
F ; [z]
)
, which is called a discriminating function, and let
K
f
be the codomain of f , i.e., K
f
= {f(x) : x ∈ F} = {a
i
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, for
some positive integer k. Let ℓi(x) =
[∏k
j = 1
j 6= i
(
ai−aj
)]−1
·
∏k
j = 1
j 6= i
(
f(x)−aj
)
,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, ℓ
i
(x) = 1, for x ∈ E
i
= {z ∈ F : f(z) − a
i
= 0}, and
ℓ
i
(x) = 0, for x ∈ F\E
i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, {E
i
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k} is a partition
of F, and ℓ
i
(x) is the characteristic function of the equivalence class E
i
,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now, the set {g
i
(z1 , . . . , zl) = ℓi
(
h(z1 , . . . , zl)
)
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k},
where h(z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ EXP
(
F ; [z1 , . . . , zl ]
)
, is a partition of unity of Fl.
Examples. (A) Let the vector space dimension of F be n as an extension field
of Z
p
, and let f(z) =
∑n
i=1 aiz
p
i−1
, where a
i
∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a noninvertible
linear operator from F into F, with Z
p
as the field. For every linear operator T
from F into F with Z
p
as the field, there exist scalars c
i
∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
Tz =
∑n
i=1 ciz
p
i−1
[[32]]. Now, each equivalence class is an affine vector subspace
of the form {y + x : f(x) = 0, x ∈ F}, for some y ∈ F. Thus, if r is the rank
of f as linear operator from F into F with Z
p
as the field, then the nullity of f is
n− r, each equivalence class has pn−r elements, and there are k = pr equivalence
classes. For the number of equivalence classes to be small, the rank r of f must be
small, such as r = 1 or r = 2. (B) Let f(z) = zr, where r is a large positive
integer dividing pn − 1. Now, the equivalence classes are {0} and the cosets of
the congruence relation x ∼ y if and only if (x−1y)r = 1, for x, y ∈ F\{0}. Since
K
f
= {0} ∪ {zr : z ∈ F\{0}}, there are k = 1 + (pn − 1)/r equivalence classes.
2.1.3 Partition of Unity of Z
pl
Let s ∈ N be a divisor of (p − 1) and k = 1 + (p−1)
s
. Now, pl−1 ≥ l, for
any l ∈ N and prime number p. Let h(x) = xsp
l−1
, for x ∈ Z
pl
. Then,(
h(x)
)k−1
= 1, for x ∈ Z⋆
pl
, and h(x) = 0, for x ∈ Z
pl
\Z⋆
pl
. Thus, the set
{xsp
l−1
: x ∈ Z
pl
} contains k distinct elements. Let x, y ∈ Z
pl
be such that
h(x) 6= h(y). If h(x) = 0 or h(y) = 0, then (h(y) − h(x)) ∈ Z⋆
pl
. Now, let
x, y ∈ Z⋆
pl
. If (x−1y)sp
l−1
= 1+bpt, for some b ∈ Z⋆
pl
and t ∈ N, then, since 1+
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bpt
∑k−1
i=1
(k−1)!
i!(k−i−1)!b
i−1p(i−1)t = (1 + bpt)k−1 =
(
(x−1y)sp
l−1)k−1
= 1 mod pl,
it follows that either t ≥ l or (k−1)+
∑k−1
i=2
(k−1)!
i!(k−i−1)!b
i−1p(i−1)t = 0 mod pl−t.
However, since k = 1 + p−1
s
, and therefore, 1 ≤ k − 1 ≤ p − 1, it follows
that (k − 1) +
∑k−1
i=2
(k−1)!
i!(k−i−1)!b
i−1p(i−1)t = k − 1 mod p. Thus, if x, y ∈ Z⋆
pl
and h(x) 6= h(y), then (x−1y)sp
l−1
− 1 6= 0 mod p, and hence if x, y ∈ Z
pl
and h(x) 6= h(y), then (h(y) − h(x)) ∈ Z⋆
pl
. If a
j
∈ Z
pl
, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are such
that {xsp
l−1
: x ∈ Z
pl
} = {a
j
: 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, then (a
i
− a
j
) ∈ Z⋆
pl
, for i 6= j,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, and the Lagrange interpolation polynomials g
j
(x) ∈ Z
p
[x] can
be obtained for the equivalence classes E
j
= {xsp
l−1
= a
j
: x ∈ Z
pl
}. Thus,
corresponding to every homomorphism of Z⋆
p
into Z⋆
p
, a partition of unity of
Z
pl
can be obtained.
2.1.4 Multivariate Mappings that Evaluate to only Invertible El-
ements
Let f(z) ∈ F[z] be a polynomial which is not surjective as a mapping from
F into F. Then, there exists an element c ∈ F, such that f(z) − c 6=
0, for every z ∈ F. For a ∈ F\{0} and g(z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ F[z1 , . . . , zl ],
a
(
f(g(z1 , . . . , zl))− c
)
6= 0, for every (z1 , . . . , zl) ∈ F
l.
Examples. (A) Let f(z) be a product of irreducible polynomials in F[z] of de-
gree 2 or more each. Then, c can be chosen to be 0. (B) Let the vector space
dimension of F be n as an extension field of Z
p
, and let f(z) =
∑n
i=1 aiz
p
i−1
, where
a
i
∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a noninvertible linear operator from F into F, with Z
p
as the
field. Then, for any basis {α
1
, . . . , α
n
} for F, with Z
p
as the field, there exists an
index j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that
∑n
i=1 aiz
p
i−1
− α
j
6= 0, for every z ∈ F, and c can be
taken to be αj . (C) Let r ≥ 2 be a positive integer divisor of p
n − 1, and let
f(z) = zr. Then, there exists an element c ∈ F\{0}, such that c(p
n
−1)/r 6= 1. Now,
since c(p
n
−1)/r 6= 0 and c(p
n
−1)/r 6= 1, it follows that f(z)− c 6= 0, for every z ∈ F.
If f(z) ∈ F[z] is such that f(z) 6= 0, for every z ∈ F, then [f(z)]−1 =∑k
i=1 a
−1
i
ℓ
i
(z), where {a
i
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k} = {f(z) : z ∈ F}, and ℓ
i
(z) =[∏k
j = 1
j 6= i
(
a
i
− a
j
)]−1
·
∏k
j = 1
j 6= i
(
f(z)− a
j
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Let n =
∏r
i=1 p
l
i
i , where r, li ∈ N and pi are distinct prime numbers,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and f(z) ∈ Z
n
[z]. From section 1.3, it can be recalled
that, f(z) ∈ Z∗
n
, for z ∈ Z
n
, if and only if for every i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
f(z) mod p
i
∈ Z∗
p
i
, for z ∈ Z
n
.
It may observed that if a ∈ F∗, n is the number of elements of F∗ and
l is a positive integer, then ag(t1 , ..., tl) ∈ F∗, for every (t1 , . . . , tl) ∈ Z
l
n
and
any expression mapping g(t1 , . . . , tl) ∈ EXP
(
Z
n
; [t1 , . . . , tl ]
)
.
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2.1.5 Invertible Square Matrices with Multivariate Mapping En-
tries
For a positive integer m, a parametric m × m invertible square matrix is
equivalent to a product of a permutation matrix, followed by a lower tri-
angular matrix with nonzero diagonal entries, an upper triangular matrix
with nonzero diagonal entries and finally by another permutation matrix,
the four matrices being parametric and written from left to right in the prod-
uct. Parametric permutation matrices can be constructed from a partition
of unity. Let gs(z1 , . . . , zl), for 0 ≤ s ≤ m− 1, be a partition of unity of F
l,
which may not necessarily be strict. Let σ ∈ Zm × Zm → Zm be a mapping
such that for each fixed r ∈ Zm, σ(r, ·) is a bijective mapping (permuta-
tion of indexes) from Zm into itself as a mapping of the second argument,
and for each fixed s ∈ Zm, σ(·, s) is a bijective mapping (permutation of
indexes) from Zm into itself, as a mapping of the first argument. Then, the
matrix with entries g
σ(i−1, j−1)
(z1 , . . . , zl) in the i-th row and j-th column,
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, is a parametric permutation matrix. For an example of an
index map σ as discussed, let f
i
and h be bijective mappings from Zm into
itself, for i ∈ {1, 2}, and σ(r, s) = h
(
(f1(r) + f2(s)) mod m
)
. It can be eas-
ily checked that the mapping σ is as required. Products and transposes of
parametric permutation matrices are also parametric permutation matrices.
Caution! This paragraph is concerning an important restriction for para-
metric surjective mappings onto Gm (and also for verification bijective map-
pings advertised in public key tables) in digital signature applications, when
G = F∗, for a finite field F, for exponential mappings. The parametric lower
and upper triangular matrices need to be chosen to be a parametric diagonal
matrix with nonzero diagonal entries, i.e., with entries that are multivariate
mappings evaluating to invertible elements, for every assignment of values
for the variables in their domains. The parametric permutation matrices
are still permitted, in any case. The reason for this caution is the difficulty
to deal with test-for-zero conditions. For overcoming this restriction, the
exponential mappings need to be extended to mappings that include 0 ∈ F
in their domains and co-domains, mapping 0 to itself, but the test-for-zero
conditions must be very carefully considered.
2.2 Univariate Bijective Mappings without Parameters
2.2.1 Single Variable Permutation Mappings without Hashing
Examples in F[x]. Bijective mappings in F[x], also called permutation
polynomials, are extensively studied as Dickson polynomials [[13]] in the
literature. A comprehensive survey on Dickson polynomials can be found
in [[1], [18], [31], [38] and [39]]. Some recent results are presented in [[2],
[3] and [4]]. If f(z) ∈ F[z] is a permutation polynomial, then, for every
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a ∈ F\{0}, b ∈ F and nonnegative integer i, the polynomial af(zp
i
)− b is a
permutation polynomial. Some easy examples are described in the following.
Examples. (A) Let F be a finite dimensional extension field of Z
p
of vec-
tor space dimension n. Any polynomial f(z) =
∑n
i=1 aiz
p
i−1
, where ai ∈ F,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is an invertible linear operator from F onto F, with Z
p
as the
field, is a permutation polynomial. (B) Let r be a positive integer divisor of
n, and f(z) = z
p
r
− az, where a
(
∑n/r
i=1
p
(i−1)r )
6= 1. Then, for every z ∈ F\{0},
z
(pr−1)
− a 6= 0, since z
p
n
−1 = z
(pr−1)
∑n/r
i=1
p
(i−1)r
= 1, and therefore, the null space
of f(z), as a linear operator from F into F with Z
p
as the field, is {0}. Thus, f(z)
is a permutation polynomial. (C) Let r be a positive integer relatively prime to
(pn − 1). Then, the polynomial f(z) = zr is a permutation polynomial.
Examples in Z
pl
[x]. Let l ∈ N and p be a prime number. For any positive
integer n, Dickson polynomials that are permutation polynomials, having
nonvanishing derivatives over the finite field containing pn elements, are
found in [[1], [2], [3], [4], [18], [31], [38] and [39]]. For a small prime number p,
two methods for construction of permutation polynomials f(x) ∈ Z
p
[x], such
that f ′(x) 6≡ 0 mod p, are described below. As a set, Z
p
is taken to be the
set of integers i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1. For p = 2, since xi+1 ≡ xi ≡ x mod 2,
for every i ∈ N and x ∈ Z
2l
, the only permutation polynomial mappings
in Z
2l
[x] are of the form b0 +
∑k
i=1 bix
i, for some k ∈ N, b
i
∈ Z
2l
, for
0 ≤ i ≤ k, such that
∑k
i=1 bi ≡ 1 mod 2, and, when l ≥ 2, b1 ≡ 1 mod 2 and∑k
i=2 ibi ≡ 0 mod 2, or equivalently, b1 ≡ 1 mod 2 and the number of indexes
j, with b2j+1 ≡ 1 and 2 ≤ 2j + 1 ≤ k, is an even integer, for the condition
f ′(x) ≡ 1 mod 2 to hold.
Now, let p ≥ 3 be a small prime number, such that the computations
below are not difficult for implementation. Let ℓ
i
(x) =
[∏
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
(i − j)
]−1
·
∏
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
(x − j) = −
∏
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
(x − j), since Z
p
is the solution set for x in the
polynomial equation xp−1 − 1 = 0, and hence,
[∏
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
(i − j)
]−1
= −1, for
i ∈ Z
p
. Now, ℓ′
i
(x) = −
∑
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
∏
p−1
k = 0
k 6∈ {i, j}
(x − k), for i ∈ Z
p
, which implies
that ℓ′
i
(j) = −
∏
p−1
k = 0
k 6∈ {i, j}
(j − k) = (j − i)−1 , for j 6= i and j ∈ Z
p
, and
ℓ′
i
(i) = −
∑
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
∏
p−1
k = 0
k 6∈ {i, j}
(i− k) =
∑
p−1
j = 0
j 6= i
(i− j)−1 = 0 , for i ∈ Z
p
, since
p ≥ 3. For a fixed permutation sequence {a
i
∈ Z
p
: 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1} of
Z
p
, either of the two procedures described below constructs a permutation
polynomial f(x) ∈ Z
p
[x], such that f(i) = a
i
and f ′(i) 6≡ 0 mod p, for i ∈ Z
p
.
Method 1 Let
∑
p−1
i=0 aiℓi(x) = b0 +
∑
p−1
i=1 bix
i, for some b
i
∈ Z
p
, for
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0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, and let g(x) = c1 +
∑
p−1
i=2 cix
i−1, for some c
i
∈ Z
p
, for
1 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, be such that g(x) 6≡ 0 mod p, for every x ∈ Z
p
. Let ρ
i
= i−1c
i
and σ
i
= b
i
− ρ
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. Let f(x) = b0 +
∑
p−1
i=1 (ρix
i + σ
i
xip).
Then, f(x) ≡ b0 +
∑
p−1
i=1 bix
i mod p, for every x ∈ Z
p
, and f ′(x) ≡ ρ1 +∑
p−1
i=2 iρix
i−1 ≡ c1 +
∑
p−1
i=2 cix
i−1 mod p, for every x ∈ Z
p
, satisfying the
stated requirement. In this method, deg
(
f(x)
)
can be as high as (p − 1)p.
In the next method, deg
(
f(x)
)
is at most (2p − 2).
Method 2 Let b
i
, c
i
, σ ∈ Z
p
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, be such that b0 = a0
and b
j
+ c
j
= a
j
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ p − 1, and let f(x) =
∑
p−1
i=0 (bi + x
p−1c
i
−
σi)ℓ
i
(x) + σxp. It can be immediately verified that f(i) ≡ a
i
mod p, for
0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, and f ′(x) =
∑
p−1
i=0 (bi + x
p−1c
i
− σi)ℓ′
i
(x) + pσxp−1 + (p −
1)xp−2
∑
p−1
i=0 ciℓi(x), where p ≥ 3. Thus, the parameters c0 , σ, bj and cj ,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ p − 1, need to be chosen such that f ′(x) 6≡ 0 mod p, for all
x ∈ Z
p
. Now, f(x) + σx =
∑
p−1
i=0 (bi + cix
p−1)ℓ
i
(x) + σxp, and f ′(x) +
σ =
∑
p−1
i=0 (bi + cix
p−1)ℓ′
i
(x) + pσxp−1 + (p − 1)xp−2
∑
p−1
i=0 ciℓi(x). Thus,
f ′(0) + σ ≡ −
∑
p−1
i=1 i
−1b
i
mod p and f ′(j) + σ ≡
∑
p−1
i = 0
i 6= j
a
i
(j − i)−1 +
c0j
−1 − j−1c
j
mod p, for 1 ≤ j ≤ p− 1, which implies that every element in
the sequence of numbers (f ′(i)+ σ) mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, is independent
of the choice of σ, and the condition that f ′(i) 6≡ 0 mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1,
is equivalent to that σ 6∈ {(f ′(i) + σ) mod p : 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1}. For p ≥
3,
∑
p−1
i=0 i ≡
∑
p−1
i=0 1 ≡ 0 mod p, and since Zp is the splitting field of the
polynomial xp − x =
∏
p−1
i=0 (x − i), the elementary symmetric polynomials
sr(t1 , t2 , . . . , tn), which are homogeneous of degree r in n variables, for the
particular instances of parameters n = p and t
i
= i − 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ p, as
defined in [[30]], are all congruent to 0 mod p, for 1 ≤ r ≤ p − 2. Thus,∑
p−1
i=0 i
r ≡
∑
p−1
i=0 1 ≡ 0 mod p, for r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ p − 2 and p ≥ 3, which
implies that for a nonzero polynomial g(x) ∈ Z
p
[x] of degree at most p− 2,∑
p−1
i=0 g(i) ≡ 0 mod p. Now, p
∑
p−1
i=0 i
p−1 ≡ 0 mod p, and, for l ∈ N, such that
p+1 ≤ l ≤ 2p− 2, l
∑
p−1
i=0 i
l−1 ≡ l
∑
p−1
i=0 i
l−1−(p−1) ≡ l
∑
p−1
i=0 i
l−p ≡ 0 mod p,
since 1 ≤ l − p ≤ p − 2. Thus, for a nonzero polynomial h(x) ∈ Z
p
[x]
of degree at most 2p − 2,
∑
p−1
i=0 h
′(i) ≡ 0 mod p. The coefficients c
i
, for
0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, must be so chosen that the additional requirement that
f(x)+σx is a polynomial of degree at most 2p−2 can also be fulfilled. Now,
let λ
i
∈ Z
p
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, be chosen, such that the cardinality of the set
Λ = {λ
i
: 0 ≤ i ≤ p−1} is at most p−1 and
∑
p−1
i=0 λi = 0. Then, cj −c0 are
found from the condition f ′(j)+σ =
∑
p−1
i = 0
i 6= j
a
i
(j− i)−1− j−1(c
j
−c0) = λj ,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ p−1, and hence, f ′(0)+σ = −
∑
p−1
i=1 i
−1b
i
= λ0 , for all choices of
c0 . Now, let σ be chosen from Zp\Λ, where the latter set is nonempty, since
the cardinality of Λ is at most p− 1, by the choices of λ
i
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1.
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Finally, c0 is chosen, and bj and cj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ p − 1, are determined by
the aforementioned conditions.
For a small prime number p, positive integers l and r, such that l ≥ 2
and 1 ≤ r ≤ l, a bijective mapping f(x) ∈ Z
pl
[x] and y ∈ Z
pl
, the fol-
lowing procedure computes xr ∈ Zpr , such that fr(xr) ≡ y mod p
r, as-
suming x1 ∈ Zp is known, such that f1(x1) ≡ y mod p, where fr(x) =
f(x) mod pr, applying the mod pr operation only to the coefficients. Let
2 ≤ r ≤ l, where l ≥ 2, s ∈ N be such that
⌈
r
2
⌉
≤ s ≤ r − 1 and
yr = y mod p
r ∈ Z
pr
, and xs = f
−1
s
(yr mod p
s) ∈ Z
ps
has been computed.
Let xˆs ∈ Zpr be such that xˆs ≡ xs mod p
s. Since fr(xˆs) ≡ yr mod p
s, it
follows that fr(xˆs) = yr + p
sgr, s(xˆs , yr), for some mapping gr, s(xˆs , yr), and
therefore, fr
(
xˆs + [f
′
r
(xˆs)]
−1 · [yr − fr(xˆs)]
)
≡ fr(xˆs) + f
′
r
(xˆs) ·
[
f ′
r
(xˆs)
]−1
·[
yr − fr(xˆs)
]
≡ fr(xˆs) +
[
yr − fr(xˆs)
]
≡ yr mod p
r. Thus, f−1
r
(yr) =
xˆs +
[
f ′
r
(xˆs)
]−1
·
[
yr − fr(xˆs)
]
mod pr. If r = l, then the f−1(y) is just
computed for y ∈ Z
pl
, and the procedure can be stopped; otherwise, the
previous steps are repeated, replacing the current value of r by min{2r, l}.
Examples in EXP
(
F ; [z]
)
. Let F be a finite field of pn elements, for some
prime number p and n ∈ N, such that pn ≥ 3, and let n = pn − 1. Let
s, t ∈ N be such that gcd(s, t) = 1, st = n and 2 ≤ s, t ≤ n − 1, and let
Ht = {x
t = 1 : x ∈ F∗}. Let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be such that f(x) mod t yields a
polynomial mapping from Zt onto itself. It may be recalled that, as a set, Zt
is assumed to consist of integers i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. Let a be a primitive
element in F∗. Now, for x ∈ Ht , since x
t = 1, applying log
a
operation
on both sides, t log
a
x = 0 mod n, which implies that log
a
x is an integer
multiple of s, for every x ∈ Ht , and, since the cyclic subgroup generated by
as is Ht , it follows that loga is a bijective mapping of Ht onto s · Zn . Now,
f(log
a
(x)) mod n, for x ∈ Ht , is an injective mapping, when restricted to
Ht , which can be modified appropriately, by changing its constant term, if
necessary, to obtain a polynomial g, which results in a bijective mapping
from s · Z
n
into itself, with respect to mod n operation. Then, the mapping
η(x) = ag(loga x), for x ∈ F∗, is such that its restriction to Ht is a bijective
mapping from Ht onto itself.
2.2.2 Hybrid Single Variable Permutation Mappings with Hash-
ing
Method 1 Let ℓ
i
(x) ∈ F[x], 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, be indicator
functions of a partition {S
i
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k} of F. Let σ be a permutation
on {1, . . . , k}, such that the set cardinalities of S
i
and S
σ(i)
are equal, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let g
i
be a mapping from F into F, such that g
i
(
S
i
)
= S
σ(i)
, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, g
i
is one-to-one when restricted to S
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let
η(x) ∈ F[x] be a permutation polynomial, and χ(x) =
∑k
i=1 ℓi(x)η(gi(x)).
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Then, χ(F) =
⋃k
i=1 η
(
g
i
(S
i
)
)
=
⋃k
i=1 η
(
S
σ(i)
)
, and since {S
σ(i)
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
is a partition of F, χ(x) is a surjective (hence bijective) polynomial from F
onto F. For inverting χ(x) = y, for fixed y ∈ F, let ξ = η−1(y). Now, there
exists exactly one index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that ξ ∈ S
σ(i)
= g
i
(
S
i
)
,
and therefore, the unique element x ∈ S
i
, such that x = g−1
i
(ξ), satisfies
χ(x) = y. If f
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are mappings from F into F, such that
f
i
(g
i
(x)) = x, for x ∈ S
i
, then χ−1(y) =
∑k
i=1 ℓσ(i)
(
η−1(y)
)
f
i
(
η−1(y)
)
, for
y ∈ F. The case of bijective mappings in EXP
(
F ; [x]
)
can be similarly
discussed. In the following examples, the corresponding examples in section
2.1.2 are revisited.
Examples. (A) Let T (x) =
∑n
i=1 aix
p
i−1
, ai ∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be of rank t, where
t is a small positive integer, such as t ∈ {1, 2}, as described in the first example
in section 2.1.2 and let V = {x ∈ F : T (x) = 0}. Then, there exist k = pt repre-
sentative elements bi ∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that {T (bi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} = T (F), and
S
i
= V + b
i
= {x + b
i
: x ∈ V }, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let f
i
(x) = c
i, 0
+
∑n
i=1 ci, jx
p
j−1
,
where c
i, j
, x ∈ F, 0 ≤ j ≤ n, be such that V ⊆ f
i
(V ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, in
the notation of the above discussion, the permutation polynomial fi(x)− bi + bσ(i)
can be chosen to be g
i
(x), for x ∈ F and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (B) Let f(z) = zt, where
t is a large positive integer dividing pn − 1, as described in the second example
of section 2.1.2. Let a
1
= 0 and a
i
∈ F∗, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, where k = 1 + (p
n
−1)
t ,
be such that {f(ai) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} is the codomain of f . Let σ be a permuta-
tion on {1, . . . , k}, such that σ(1) = 1, and let H
t
= {y ∈ F : yt = 1}. Then,
S
i
= a
i
H
t
= {a
i
v : v ∈ H
t
}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let h
i
(x), x ∈ H
t
, be a bijective map-
ping discussed in the previous section, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, representing elements
c
i
∈ F∗ can be found easily, such that the mapping g
i
(x) = c
i
h
i
(a−1
i
x) satisfies
g
i
(
S
i
)
= S
σ(i)
, for x ∈ S
i
and 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
Method 2 Let G be F∗ or F. Let k, ρ ∈ N, such that 2 ≤ k ≤ ρ. Let f
i
be
bijective mappings from G into itself, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, and h be a mapping from
G into itself, such that h
(
f
i
(x)
)
= h
(
f
j
(x)
)
, for x ∈ G and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ρ. Let
σ be a permutation on {1, . . . , ρ}, and {S
i
: 1 ≤ i ≤ k} be a partition of
F, and let ℓ
i
(x), x ∈ F, be the indicator function of S
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let η
be a bijective mapping from G into G, and ζ(x) =
∑k
i=1 ℓi
(
h(x)
)
η
(
f
σ(i)
(x)
)
,
for x ∈ G. Let x, y ∈ G be such that ζ(x) = ζ(y), and let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
be such that ℓ
i
(h(x)) = 1 and ℓ
j
(h(y)) = 1. Then, η
(
f
σ(i)
(x)
)
= η
(
f
σ(j)
(y)
)
,
and since η is bijective, it follows that f
σ(i)
(x) = f
σ(j)
(y). Now, since
h
(
f
i
(x)
)
= h
(
f
j
(x)
)
, for x ∈ G and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ρ, and σ is a permutation
on the set {1, . . . , ρ}, it follows that h(x) = h(y), σ(i) = σ(j) and i = j,
and therefore, x = y. Thus, ζ−1(y) =
∑k
i=1 ℓi
(
h(η−1(y))
)
f−1
σ(i)
(
η−1(y)
)
, for
y ∈ G.
Examples. (A) Let (i) f be a bijective mapping from G into itself, such that the
cyclic group generated by it, as a subgroup of bijective mappings from G into G,
with composition as the group operation, is of small order ρ ≥ 2, (ii) g : Gρ → F is
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a symmetric function, which can be an expression in EXP
(
F ; [z
1
, . . . , z
ρ
]
)
, sym-
metric in all the ρ variables, (iii) f
0
(x) = x and f
i
(x) = f
(
f
i−1
(x)
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ,
and (iv) h(x) = g
(
x, f
1
(x), . . . , f
ρ−1
(x)
)
, for x ∈ G. Then, f
ρ
(x) = x and, since
h
(
f(x)
)
= h(x), for x ∈ G, it follows that h
(
fi(x)
)
= h
(
fj (x)
)
, for x ∈ G and
1 ≤ i, j ≤ ρ. If G = F∗, then it is interesting to choose f(x) = aφ(loga x), for
x ∈ F∗ and some primitive element a ∈ F∗. However, it is important to choose
f such that ρ is a small positive integer. (B) Let G = F∗ and s, t, v ∈ N be
such that gcd(s, t) = 1, st = n, 2 ≤ s, t ≤ n − 1, sv = 1 mod t and s large. Let
φ : Z
n
→ Z
n
be a polynomial mapping such that svφ(y) is a bijective mapping
from svZ
n
into itself and the order of the cyclic group generated by svφ(y) as a
subgroup of the group of bijective mappings from svZ
n
into itself is a small pos-
itive integer ρ. Now, let π(x) = asvφ(loga x), for x ∈ F∗, where a is a primitive
element in F∗. Then, π
(
F
∗
)
= π
(
H
t
)
= H
t
, where H
t
= {x ∈ F∗ : xt = 1}. Let
π
1
= π and π
i+1
= π
i
(π), for i ∈ N. Then, π
ρ+1
(x) = π
1
(x), for x ∈ H
t
. Let f
i
be bijective mappings from F∗ into itself, such that the restriction of fi to Ht is
π
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, and g be the symmetric mapping as in the previous example and
h(x) = g
(
π
1
(x), . . . , π
ρ
(x)
)
. It can be easily checked that h
(
f
i
(x)
)
= h
(
f
j
(x)
)
, for
x ∈ G and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ρ.
2.3 Multivariate Injective Mappings without Parameters
2.3.1 Multivariate Injective Mappings from Gm into Em
In this subsection, an iterative algorithm to construct a multivariate bijective
mapping from Gm into Em, for m ∈ N, is described. The algorithm utilises
parametric univariate bijective mappings discussed in the previous sections.
In later subsections, some variations involving hashing are described.
1. Let f
i
: G→ G and g
i
: E→ E, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be bijective mappings.
2. Let h
i
(z1 , . . . , zm−1 ; x) be parametric injective mappings from G into
E, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, x ∈ G and z1 , . . . , zm−1 ∈ E being parameters,
constructed, for example, as described in section 2.1.1.
3. Let ζ
i
(x) = h
i
(
ζ
i+1(x), . . . , ζm(x), x1 , . . . , xi−1 ; fi(xi)
)
and η
i
(x) =
g
i
(
ζ
i
(x)
)
, for x = (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ G
m and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let η(x) =
(η1(x), . . . , ηm(x)).
For finding x = (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ G
m, such that η(x) = y, for any fixed y =
(y1 , . . . , ym) ∈ E
m, let ǫ
i
= g−1
i
(y
i
) and δ
i
= h−1
i
(ǫ
i+1
, . . . , ǫ
m
, x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
; ǫ
i
),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then, x
i
= f−1
i
(δ
i
), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, for E = F and
G = F∗, if g
i
and h
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are bijective mappings and parametric
bijective mappings, respectively, from F∗ into F∗, then the above procedure
can be applied to obtain multivariate bijective mappings from Gm into Gm.
These mappings are required in appealing for a security that is immune to
threats resulting from Gro¨bner basis analysis. It can be observed that one
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level of exponentiation suffices for the purpose.
A one-to-one mapping from Gm into En, where m and n are positive
integers, with m ≤ n, and G is a subset of a finite field F, is obtained as
follows: for a carefully chosen bijective mapping P (y) from Gn into En and
hashing keys f
i
(x), for x = (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ G
m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n − m, the
argument vector (f1(x), . . . , fn−m(x), x1 , . . . , xm) is substituted for y ∈ G
n
in P (y). Thus, Q(x) = P (f1(x), . . . , fn−m(x), x1 , . . . , xm) is a generic
multivariate one-to-one mapping from Gm into Gn.
2.3.2 Hybrid Multivariate Injective Mappings with Hashing
For Method 1 of the previous subsection, in the first example, in place
of T (x), x ∈ F, T
(
α(x)
)
, x ∈ Fm, and in the second example, in place
of f(z), z ∈ F, f
(
β(x)
)
, x ∈ Fm, are chosen, where α : Fm → F is a non
constant affine mapping in the first example, and β(x) = c
∏m
i=1 x
s
i
i , for some
nonnegative integers s
i
, which, when positive, are relatively prime to pn−1,
and, when zero, for the corresponding subscript index i, the variable x
i
does
not occur in the product, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that β(x) is nonconstant, in the
second example. Similarly, Method 2 hashing of the previous subsection can
also be extended to multivariate mappings, replacing x with x, and choosing
Φ(y) = (φ1(y), . . . , φm(y)
)
to be a bijective mapping from Zm
n
into itself in
place of φ(y). It can be observed that g can also be chosen to depend only on
a few scalar components from each vector, while maintaining symmetry in all
its vector parameters, with each vector consisting of m scalars components.
In the first example of Method 2 hashing of the previous section, if h(x) is a
symmetric mapping in its m components, then f(x) can be chosen to be a
permutation of components of x, independent of order ρ of the cyclic group
generated by f , with respect to composition operation.
3 Public Key Cryptography and Digital Signature
Let the number of elements in the plain message (or plain signature message)
be µ, and the number of elements in the encrypted message (or encrypted
signature message) be ν, where µ, ν ∈ N and µ ≤ ν. Let E be F or Z
n
,
and G ⊆ E be the set from which plain message elements are sampled. If
the number of plain and encrypted (or plain and signed) messages are the
same, then a multivariate bijective mapping P : Gµ → Gµ is chosen and
advertised in the public key lookup table T, while P−1 is saved in the back
substitution table B. Let
(
ξ1 , . . . , ξµ
)
∈ Gµ be plain message. For public key
cryptography, the encrypted message is
(
ǫ1 , . . . , ǫµ
)
= P
(
ξ1 , . . . , ξµ
)
, and
the decryption is P−1
(
ǫ1 , . . . , ǫµ
)
. For digital signature, the signed message
is
(
ǫ1 , . . . , ǫµ
)
= P−1
(
ξ1 , . . . , ξµ
)
, and recovered message is P
(
ǫ1 , . . . , ǫµ
)
.
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In the remaining part of the section, it is assumed that 1 ≤ µ ≤ ν − 1.
Let κ be the number of padding message elements in the hashing keys. It
is assumed that the key generator ensures that a prospective owner of the
pertinent keys is provided with an abundance of options for generating multi-
variate one-to-one mappings, whose inverse mappings are known only to the
owner. Let x = (x1 , . . . , xµ) ∈ G
µ be the plain message, y = (y1 , . . . , yν ) ∈
Eν be the encrypted or signed message, and ω = (ω1 , . . . , ωκ) ∈ G
κ be a
padding message. For public key encryption, an injective mapping P from
Gν into Eν is chosen, while for digital signature, a surjective mapping P from
Gν onto Gµ (in addition to two more surjective mappings) is chosen. Thus,
for public key cryptography mapping, invertible parametric matrices in the
most general form can be utilised, while for digital signature multivariate
surjective or bijective mappings, only parametric permutation and diagonal
matrices are employed.
For public key cryptography, let λ = ν − µ, and let P be an injective
mapping from Gν into Eν . Let y ∈ Gν be the argument vector of the bijec-
tive mapping P . Then, the vector
(
f1(x, ω), . . . , fλ(x, ω), x1 , . . . , xµ
)
, for
some hidden keys f1(x, ω), . . . , fλ(x, ω), is substituted for y of the public
key encryption mapping. Let F (x, ω) =
(
f1(x, ω), . . . , fλ(x, ω)
)
, and it is
assumed that F (x, ω) ∈ Gλ, for x ∈ Gµ and ω ∈ Gκ. The information re-
quired to compute P−1(ε), for ε ∈ Eν , and the hidden hashing keys F (x, ω),
for x ∈ Gµ and ω ∈ Gκ, is saved in a private key back-substitution table B,
while the mapping P
(
F (x, ω), x
)
is saved in the public key lookup table T.
If the sender and receiver agree on ω, and the encrypted message received is
ε ∈ Gν , then, with (z, x) = P−1(ε), the receiver can ascertain data integrity
by testing whether F (x, ω) = z. It is possible to utilise ω as a session key
in handshake protocols for repeated key negotiations.
For digital signature, let κ λ,K, L, µ and ν be positive integers, such that
K ≤ κ, L ≤ λ and ν ≥ L+µ. Let P , Q andR be multivariate surjective map-
ping from Gν onto GL+µ, from Gκ onto GK and from Gλ onto GL, respectively.
The right inverse mappings of the stated multivariate surjective mappings
are known only to the signer. Let F (x, ω) =
(
f1(x, ω), . . . , fL(x, ω)
)
. The
components of the mapping P , corresponding to the plain message, are ad-
vertised in a public key signature verification table V, and the information
for computing a right inverse of P — and, in general, all the information
required by the signing algorithm — is saved in a private key signature table
S, for signing plain message. Now, for a plain message x ∈ Gµ and a padding
message ω ∈ Gκ, the signed message ε is obtained by applying a right in-
verse mapping of P on the instance (z′, x) ∈ GL+µ, where z′ = F (x, ω). The
parameter z ∈ Gλ is so chosen by the signer that F (x, ω) = R(z), by com-
puting a right inverse of the multivariate surjective mapping R. For a plain
message x ∈ Gµ, the padding message ω ∈ Gκ is obtained by computing a
right inverse, which is known only to the signer, of the multivariate surjec-
tive mapping Q from Gκ onto GK , such that Q(ω) = ω′, where ω′ ∈ GK is
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agreed upon by the singer with a trusted authentication verifier TAV, for this
particular signature transaction, as a first step in the signature generation
procedure. The plain message can be found by computing the components
of the mapping P , that are advertised in the public key signature verification
table V, for a signed message ε ∈ Gν . For claiming the authenticity of the
signature, the receiver of the signature needs to produce also z, which must
be transmitted to the receiver by the signer. In addition to the signature
verification table V, containing plain message components of the mapping
P , another table A, called the signature authentication table, containing the
full mapping P and additional functions H(z, x, ω), with several compo-
nents, i.e., with values in Eτ , for some positive integer τ , is employed for
signature authentication verification purpose, for which the signer meeds
to provide (z, δ, ω), where δ ∈ Eτ is such that δ = H
(
z, x, ω
)
, at the
signer end, and the signature authentication is verified by testing whether
H(z, x, ω) = δ and R(z) = F (x, ω), by the verification authority, such
that the vector (z, x, ω) satisfies additional conditions, such as Q(ω) = ω′,
where ω′ has been consented by the TAV for this signature.
The signature authentication table A is registered with a trusted authen-
tication verifier (TAV), which is a public authority responsible for signature
authentication verification purpose. The authentication information shared
by the signer with TAV contains the multivariate mappings P (ε), F (x, ω),
Q(ω) and R(z), where P , Q and R are surjective mappings from Gν onto
GL+µ, from Gκ onto GK and from Gλ onto GL, respectively. The information
required to compute any right inverse mappings of P , Q and R is known
only to the owner of the signature keys, i.e., the signer. The verification
protocol at TAV side checks whether Q(ω) and x meet certain obligations,
and whether R(z) = F (x, ω), without knowing right inverse mappings of
Q and R. Now, for a particular plain message x to be signed, the signer
obtains an extra padding message ω′ ∈ GK , with the consent of TAV, con-
forming to the predefined agreement for a valid padding message with TAV,
and computes right inverse of Q with ω′ as the argument, to get the actual
padding message ω ∈ Gκ. Finally, with x and ω having been chosen or
computed, the signer generates z ∈ Gλ by computing a right inverse of R
with F (x, ω) as the argument, and the signature itself by computing the
inverse of the key mapping P , which is a multivariate surjective mapping
from Gν into GL+µ.
It is possible to include H(z, x, ω) in the signature verification public
key table V, in order to facilitate the receiver with a data integrity check,
before approaching the TAV. This choice depends on the group of possi-
ble receivers and signers besides TAV. If the intended group of possible
receivers is very large, such as external world, then it is convenient to re-
serve H(z, x, ω) to be present only in the signature authentication table A.
In any case, the components of the map P corresponding to F (x, ω) may
be exclusively present only in the signature authentication table A, since
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disclosing this information to the public may lead to its speculation based
on various observed values.
In the proposed model of digital signature scheme, the signer approaches
the TAV, with a request for generating a signed message for a specific pur-
pose. The TAV issues consent for a particular extra padding message ω′,
for a period of validity along with a transaction number. The extra padding
message ω′ may contain a small gist of transaction details, encrypted by the
key of TAV. Thus, the signer must request TAV, for the issuance of the extra
padding message ω′, by submitting a form containing a gist of transaction
or signature details and its intended purpose. The TAV then generates an
extra padding message ω′, transaction number and period of validity, and
issues them to the signer. The signer is required to transmit the transaction
number and period of validity to the intended receiver of the signature, who
will have to produce these particulars to TAV for claiming the authenticity
of the signed message. It may additionally be required that the claimants
of the authenticity of a signed message will be required to furnish their sig-
natures to TAV, with TAV and possibly also the sender bearing the role of
the receiver, for a proof of the claim.
Multivariate surjective mappings can be realised as parametric map-
pings, which are bijective for some choice of parameter component values,
and may be arbitrary mappings for some other choice of parameter values.
The choice of parameters is known to the signer. For example, for the multi-
variate surjective mapping Q from Gκ onto GK , κ−K components of ω are
taken in the argument vector of the partition of unity functions of section
2.1, with l = κ−K and m = K, in the notation followed there. When com-
bined with the partitioning methods of section 2.1.1, for some partitions,
with index i, the mappings ζ
i
(
z1 , . . . , zl ; x
)
are chosen to be bijective, and
for the remaining, the mappings are arbitrary.
4 Complexity Analysis of Computation of Inverse
Mappings of Multivariate Mappings by Solving
Simultaneous Multivariate Equations
Model theory of fields and polynomial algebras is extensively studied in
mathematical logic [[12], [14], [20], [35] and [36]]. Let F be a field, and let
ARITH-EXP(F) be the set of arithmetic expressions without quantifiers, ob-
tained by collecting the expressions involving any number of finitely many
variables, constructed using parentheses and the binary or unary arithmetic
operators of addition +, subtraction −, multiplication ·, possibly division /,
exponentiation k, where k is a positive integer, and binary valued relational
operator = (and possibly other relational operators such as <, >, ≤ and
≥). The relational operators allow construction of assertions that evaluate
to anyone of the special symbolic constants false and true, represented by
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0 and 1, respectively. In the sequel, the variables assume values from F, the
arithmetic expressions evaluate to values in F, as defined by the arithmetic
operations in F, and the assertions evaluate to values in {0, 1}. A variable
taking values in {0, 1} is a boolean variable. The arithmetic expressions in
ARITH-EXP(Z2) are boolean expressions. For any field F, a boolean variable
x can be obtained from the equation x2−x = 0. For boolean variables x and
y, ¬x can be represented by 1−x, x∧y by x ·y, x∨y by 1−(1−x) ·(1−y),
x⊕y by (x−y)2, x→ y by 1−x ·(1−y), and x↔ y by 1−(x−y)2, where ¬
denotes the logical “negation”, ∧ the logical “and”, ∨ the logical “or”, ⊕ the
logical “exclusive or”, → the logical “implies”, and ↔ the logical “implies
and is implied by”. The inequality operator, denoted by 6=, is a secondary
binary operator defined as the logical negation of the equality operator. Let
ARITH-EXP
Q
(F) be the set of arithmetic expressions in which some (none,
some or all) variables are constrained by “existential” ∃ or “universal” ∀
quantifiers. A variable constrained by a quantifier is called a bound variable.
A variable that is not bound is called a free variable. An arithmetic expres-
sion in which all the variables are free is a quantifier free arithmetic expres-
sion, i.e., an expression in ARITH-EXP(F). A quantified arithmetic expres-
sion is in prenex normal form, if all the quantifiers occur before the otherwise
quantifier free arithmetic expression, i.e, a quantified arithmetic expression
of the form ∀y
1
. . . ∀y
k
1
∃x
1
. . . ∀y
k
i−1
+1
. . . ∀y
k
i
∃x
i
. . . ∀y
k
m−1
+1
. . . ∀y
km
∃x
m
∀y
km+1
. . . ∀y
n
f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
), where m and n are positive
integers, and k
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nonnegative integers such that k
i
≤ k
i+1 ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1, and km ≤ n. The variables yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent
variables, as they are bound to universal quantifiers. The variable x
i
de-
pends on the variables y
j
, 1 ≤ j ≤ k
i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and is a dependent bound
variable. A tuple
(
a1 , . . . , ai , b1 , . . . , bk
i
)
∈ Fi+ki , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is feasible to
a quantified arithmetic expression in prenex normal form with no free vari-
ables as described before, if either i = m and f(a1 , . . . , am , b1 , . . . , bkm ,
y
km+1
, . . . , yn) evaluates to true, for ykm+1 , . . . , yn ∈ F, or 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1
and for y
k
i
+1
, . . . , y
k
i+1
∈ F, and for some x
i+1 ∈ F, that may depend on
a1 , . . . , ai , , b1 , . . . , bk
i
, y
k
i
+1
, . . . , y
k
i+1
∈ F, each tuple (a
1
, . . . , a
i
, x
i+1
,
b
1
, . . . , b
k
i
, y
k
i
+1
, . . . , y
k
i+1
) is feasible. If for every b1 , . . . , bk1
∈ F, there
exists a1 ∈ F, such that the tuple
(
a1 , b1 , . . . , bk1
)
is feasible, then the
given instance of binary valued quantified arithmetic expression is satisfiable.
The evaluation problem for quantified boolean expressions in prenex normal
form with no free variables in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F) is to find whether the given
input instance is satisfiable. Let ARITH-EXP
Q−SAT
(F) ⊆ ARITH-EXP
Q
(F)
be the set of satisfiable binary valued quantified arithmetic expressions
(i.e., quantified arithmetic assertions) in prenex normal form with no free
variables that evaluate to true. Let B
Q
and B
Q−SAT
be ARITH-EXP
Q
(Z2)
and ARITH-EXP
Q−SAT
(Z2), respectively. By the previous discussion, every
boolean expression in B
Q
, analogously in B
Q−SAT
, can be represented by some
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arithmetic expression in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F), analogously in ARITH-EXP
Q−SAT
(F),
with equality binary relation, for any field F. The evaluation problem for
quantified boolean expressions in prenex normal form with no free variables
in BQ is PSPACE-complete, where PSPACE is the set of formal languages
acceptable in polynomial space [[25]].
It may be recalled that, by convention, the binary value of true is taken
to be 1 and that of false is 0. It is occasionally convenient to interpret
true to be “nonzero” and false to be the value 0.
4.1 Constraint Satisfaction and Quantifier Elimination Prob-
lems
Let ∀y1 . . . ∀yk
1
∃x1 . . . ∀yk
i−1
+1
. . . ∀y
k
i
∃xi . . . ∀yk
m−1
+1
. . . ∀y
km
∃xm
∀y
km+1
. . . ∀y
n
f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
) be an instance in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F),
where m and n are positive integers, and k
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nonneg-
ative integers such that k
i
≤ k
i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and km ≤ n. A
functional solution for the given instance of constraint satisfaction prob-
lem is a sequence of quantifier free arithmetic expressions g1(y1 , . . . , yk1
)
and g
i
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
), 2 ≤ i ≤ m, in ARITH-EXP
(
F
)
, such that
∀y1 . . . ∀yn f(x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn) = true, where x1 = g1(y1 , . . . , yk1 )
and xi = gi(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
), 2 ≤ i ≤ m. The constraint satisfaction
problem is feasible, if it has a functional solution in quantifier free arithmetic
expressions.
Let P(F) be a set of parametric subsets of F, parametrised by variables
assuming values in F, such that the binary valued characteristic functions of
the sets are assertions in ARITH-EXP(F). For an instance in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F),
the quantifier elimination problem is to compute parametric sets G
i
(x
1
, . . . ,
xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) in P(F), for x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
∈ F, such that
G
i
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
) ={
xi ∈ F : (x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) is feasible to the given instance
}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, for an instance in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F), the problem of
computing feasible parameter sets is to compute, for x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
∈ F, the characteristic (indicator) functions θ
i
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
) in
ARITH-EXP(F), such that the function θ
i
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) evaluates
to nonzero, if and only if the corresponding set G
i
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
)
is nonempty, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Set solutions can be enumerated by backtrack-
ing method [[26]]. In the definition of ARITH-EXP(F), relational assertions
may also be present.
Theorem 1 The problem of computing feasible parameter sets for instances
in prenex normal form in ARITH-EXPQ(F) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Let ∀y1 . . . ∀yk
1
∃x1 . . . ∀yk
i−1
+1
. . . ∀y
k
i
∃xi . . . ∀yk
m−1
+1
. . . ∀y
km
∃xm
∀y
km+1
. . . ∀y
n
f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
) be an instance in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F),
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where m and n are positive integers, and k
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nonnegative
integers such that k
i
≤ k
i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, and km ≤ n. Then, for the
instance ∃x
0
∀y
1
. . . ∀y
k
1
∃x
1
. . . ∀y
k
i−1
+1
. . . ∀y
k
i
∃x
i
. . . ∀y
k
m−1
+1
. . . ∀y
km
∃x
m
∀y
km+1
. . . ∀y
n
(
x
0
· f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
)
in
ARITH-EXP
Q
(F), the characteristic function χ0 for the feasible parameter set
of x0 is nonzero if and only if the originally given instance is feasible. 
4.2 Simultaneous Multivariate Polynomial Equations
Let P(F) be a set of parametric subsets of F, parametrised by variables
assuming values in F, such that the binary valued characteristic functions of
the sets are assertions in ARITH-EXP(F). Let l, m, n ∈ N and ft
(
x1 , . . . , xm,
y1 , . . . , yn
)
∈ ARITH-EXP(F), for 1 ≤ t ≤ l, be arithmetic expressions. A
system of (multivariate) polynomial equations is the following:
ft
(
x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn
)
= 0 , 1 ≤ t ≤ l , (1)
where y
j
, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent variables, and x
i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are
dependent variables, assuming values from F, both specified as part of an
instance. The expressions in (1) may also involve relational assertions.
A tuple
(
a1 , . . . , ai , b1 , . . . , bn
)
is feasible to (1), if either (1) i = m and
(1) holds with xr = ar , for 1 ≤ r ≤ m, and yj = bj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, or (2)
1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and
(
a1 , . . . , ai , ai+1 , b1 , . . . , bn
)
is feasible for some a
i+1 ,
possibly depending on
(
a1 , . . . , ai , b1 , . . . , bn
)
. Let P
(
F
)
be the collection
of admissible subsets of F, whose indicator functions are in ARITH-EXP
(
F
)
.
A complete solution to (1) are parametric sets H
i
(
a
1
, . . . , a
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
∈ P
(
F
)
, such that H
i
(
a
1
, . . . , a
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
=
{
a
i
∈ F :
(
a
1
, . . . , a
i−1
, a
i
,
y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
is feasible
}
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, the problem of computing
feasible parameter sets to (1) is to compute the quantifier free characteristic
(indicator) functions ϑ
i
(
x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
in ARITH-EXP(F), such that
ϑ
i
(
x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
6= 0 if and only if H
i
(
x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
6= ∅,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
In the system of multivariate equations of (1), the ordering of the vari-
ables x1 , . . . , xm appears specified. However, this ordering can be made
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innocuous by additional constraints as follows:
v2
i, j
= vi, j and w
2
i, j
= wi, j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m
m∑
j=1
v
i, j
= 1 and v
i, j
· v
i, k
= 0 , 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ m and j 6= k
m∑
i=1
vi, j = 1 and vi, j · vk, j = 0 , 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ m and i 6= k
m∑
j=1
w
i, j
= 1 and w
i, j
· w
i, k
= 0 , 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ m and j 6= k
m∑
i=1
w
i, j
= 1 and w
i, j
· w
k, j
= 0 , 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ m and i 6= k


v1, 1 v1, 2 . . . v1, m
v
2, 1
v
2, 2
. . . v
2, m
...
...
...
...
v
m, 1
v
m, 2
. . . v
m,m




x1
x
2
...
x
m

 =


w1, 1 w1, 2 . . . w1, m
w
2, 1
w
2, 2
. . . w
2, m
...
...
...
...
w
m, 1
w
m, 2
. . . w
m,m




xm+1
x
m+2
...
x
2m


and f
i
(
x
m+1
, . . . , x
2m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
)
= 0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ l
where y
j
, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent variables, and all the remaining vari-
ables are dependent variables. The ordering is concealed by allowing the
system to choose an appropriate ordering of the variables x
m+1 , . . . , x2m ,
while allowing x1 , . . . , xm to appear in the specified order. In the above set
of constraints, for each row of the matrix
[
v
i, j
]
1≤i, j≤m
, for the constraints
on i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and for each column of the matrix
[
v
i, j
]
1≤i, j≤m
, for the
constraints on j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the first constraint requires at least one entry
of 1, and the second constraint requires (m− 1) entries of 0, in the respec-
tive row or column, and the matrix
[
v
i, j
]
1≤i, j≤m
is a permutation matrix.
Similarly, the matrix
[
w
i, j
]
1≤i, j≤m
is also a permutation matrix.
For indexes i and j, where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ l, an inequation condition
of the form f
i
(
x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn
)
6= 0 can be converted into an
equation by the addition of a new dependent variable z
i
and the condition(
z
i
·f
i
(x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn)
)
−1 = 0. After converting inequations into
equations, any newly introduced variables are assigned precedence ordering,
that is usually subsequent to the dependent variables in the original system,
or may also be left unspecified. The disjunction of equations f
i
(x1 , . . . , xm,
y1 , . . . , yn) = 0 or fj(x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn) = 0 can be replaced with(
f
i
(x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn) · fj(x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn)
)
= 0, to turn the
disjunction into simultaneity.
The problems of computing solutions, complete solutions and character-
istic (indicator) functions of feasible parameter sets for selective dependent
variables, x
i
j
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ r ≤ m, can be easily defined, where 1 ≤ i
j
< i
j+1 ,
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for 1 ≤ j ≤ r− 1 and 1 ≤ r ≤ m, requiring the correspondingly stated solu-
tions only for these dependent variables, treating the remaining dependent
variables as bound by existential quantifiers. A procedure for solving a sys-
tem of simultaneous multivariate equations may solve for all the dependent
variables, while producing output solutions only for the selective variables.
The mentioning of existential quantifiers may be bypassed, for the solutions
of selective variables.
Theorem 2 The combined problem of computing feasible parameter sets
and quantifier elimination for the instances in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F), that are
with no free variables and in prenex normal form, is polynomial time sub-
routine reducible to that of simultaneous multivariate equations for selective
variables over F.
Proof. Let ∀y1 . . . ∀yk
1
∃x1 . . . ∀yk
i−1
+1
. . . ∀y
k
i
∃xi . . . ∀yk
m−1
+1
. . . ∀y
km
∃xm
∀y
km+1
. . . ∀y
n
f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
n
) be an instance in ARITH-EXP
Q
(F)
in prenex normal form with no free variables, where m and n are positive
integers, and k
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nonnegative integers such that k
i
≤ k
i+1 ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, and km ≤ n.
Let χ
i
(x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) be the characteristic function of the fea-
sible parameter set for the selective variable z
i, k
i
+1
, whenever k
i
< k
i+1 , for
the instance of simultaneous multivariate equations
φ
i+1
(x
1
, . . . , x
i
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
, z
i, k
i
+1
, . . . , z
i, k
i+1
) = 0
with x
1
, . . . , x
i
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
as the independent variables and z
i, k
i
+1
, . . . ,
z
i, k
i+1
as the dependent variables with the specified mandatory ordering, for
i = m, . . . , 1, in the descending order, where k
m+1 = n and
φ
m+1
(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
km
, z
m, km+1
, . . . , z
m, k
m+1
) =
f(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
km
, z
m, km+1
, . . . , z
m, k
m+1
)
If ki = ki+1 , then let χi(x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) be ¬φi+1(x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
After obtaining χ
i
(x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
), for some index i, where 1 ≤
i ≤ m — such that the condition χ
i
(x1 , . . . , xi , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) = 0 is the
defining relation of the solution set G
i
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
), for the
variable x
i
, with x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
as the parameters, for the quan-
tifier elimination problem, as will be shown in a subsequent paragraph —
let φ
i
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
) be the characteristic function of the feasible
parameter set of the variable x
i
, for the instance of simultaneous multivari-
ate equations
χ
i
(x
1
, . . . , x
i
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
) = 0
with x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i
as the independent variables and x
i
as the
dependent variable, for i = m, . . . , 1, in the descending order.
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It may be observed that the condition χ
m
(x
1
, . . . , x
m
, y
1
, . . . , y
km
) =
0 is the defining relation of the solution set G
m
(x
1
, . . . , x
m−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
km
),
for the variable xm , with x1 , . . . , xm−1 , y1 , . . . , ykm as the parameters, for
the quantifier elimination problem, and that the condition φi(x1 , . . . , xi−1 ,
y1 , . . . , yk
i
) 6= 0 is the defining relation for some parametric set of values of
x
i−1
, denoted by H
i−1
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−2
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
), to be nonempty, such that
the set G
i−1
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−2
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i−1
) is given by
⋂
y
k
i−1
+1
· · ·
⋂
y
k
i
H
i−1
(x
1
,
. . . , x
i−2
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
), for x
1
, . . . , x
i−2
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i
∈ F and 2 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1.
Now, the function χi−1(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , y1 , . . . , yk
i−1
), for 2 ≤ i ≤ m + 1,
is the characteristic function of the feasible parameter set for the selective
variable z
i−1, k
i−1
+1
for the instance of simultaneous multivariate equations
φ
i
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i−1
, z
i−1, k
i−1
+1
, . . . , z
i−1, k
i
) = 0
with x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i−1
as the independent variables and z
i−1, k
i−1
+1
,
. . . , z
i−1, k
i
as the dependent variables with the specified mandatory order-
ing. Thus, the condition χ
i−1
(x
1
, . . . , x
i−1
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i−1
) = 0 is the defining
relation for the solution set, namely, Gi−1(x1 , . . . , xi−2 , y1 , . . . , yk
i−1
), for the
variable x
i−1
in the given instance of quantifier elimination problem, with
x
1
, . . . , x
i−2
, y
1
, . . . , y
k
i−1
as the parameters. 
5 Security Analysis
The classical analysis of multivariate simultaneous equations can be applied
only to polynomial equations [[12], [14], [34], [35], [36] and [47]], and the
Gro¨bner basis analysis [[8], [16] and [17]] is employed as the main practical
tool. A general purpose method for solving multivariate mappings involving
functions as exponents is not known as yet. For a security that is immune
to threats from Gro¨bner basis analysis, parametric injective mappings from
Gµ into Eν , with κ parameters, for G = F∗, E = F and µ, ν, κ ∈ N, where
1 ≤ µ ≤ ν and F is a finite field, with component mappings taken as expres-
sions from EXP
(
F ; [x
1
, . . . , x
µ
, ω
1
, . . . , ω
κ
]
)
, restricting values of x
i
and ω
j
to
F
∗, for 1 ≤ i ≤ µ and 1 ≤ j ≤ κ, with at least one level of exponentiation as
described in section 1.5, are required. It is also assumed that the key gener-
ator ensures that a prospective owner of the pertinent keys is provided with
an abundance of options for generating multivariate one-to-one mappings,
whose inverse mappings are known only to the owner.
In public key cryptography, the size of the set {F (x, ω) : ω ∈ Fκ} must
be large, such as perhaps exponential in νc, for some fixed c > 0, for each
x ∈ Fµ, while maintaining F (x, ω) as a secret to the public, for IND-CCA
and IND-CPA security, whichever is relevant. Under the assumption of no
mistrust, the padding message ω can be negotiated for mutual agreement
by sender and receiver, for ascertaining data integrity, in public key cryp-
tography.
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For digital signature, the main security issue is the anonymity of the
secret keys F (x, ω) =
(
f
1
(x, ω), . . . , f
L
(x, ω)
)
, which are registered with
a trusted authentication verifier (TAV). The size of the set {ω ∈ Gκ :
H(z, x, ω) = δ}, where z ∈ Gλ, x ∈ Gµ and δ ∈ Eτ , must be large, such
as perhaps exponential in νc, for some fixed c > 0, whenever the set in the
discussion is nonempty, and the ratio of the number of elements in {(ω, z) ∈
Gκ+λ : H(z, x, ω) = δ} to that in {(ω, z) ∈ Gκ+λ : H(z, x, ω) = δ} ∩
{(ω, z) ∈ Gκ+λ : R(z) = F (x, ω)} must be large, if H(z, x, ω) occur in
the public key signature verification table V, whenever the stated sets are
nonempty, such as perhaps exponential in νc, for some fixed c > 0 and
any fixed δ ∈ Eτ , admissible plain message x ∈ Gµ and admissible padding
message ω ∈ Gκ. The admissibility of the padding message ω ∈ Gκ is that
R(ω) = ω′, where ω′ ∈ GK is the extra padding message agreed upon by the
signer with TAV, for the particular reserved transaction, as a first step in
the process of generating the signature. The hidden or secret keys F (x, ω)
must not be made known to the public, but, in the digital signature scheme,
are shared with the TAV, besides the signer, in order to ensure existential
unforgeability. For claiming the authenticity of a signature, the claimant
needs to produce ǫ, δ, x, z and ω, for passing the tests of TAV, without
knowing the information in the signature authentication verification table A,
which is registered with TAV. The signer must assert with TAV, by means
of ω′ and other protocol agreements, regarding authorization of a signature.
Thus, the signer is protected by the prudence and unbiasedness of TAV.
6 Conclusion and Summary
In this paper, a new public key data encryption method is proposed, where
the plain and encrypted messages are arrays. The method can also be used
for digital certificate or digital signature applications. For security protocols
of the application layer level in the OSI model, the methods described in
this paper are useful. In the regular protocols like TLS and IPSec [[44]
and [45]], the traditional methods, requiring only small space for the keys
and algorithms, are employed. The key generation algorithm is particularly
simple, easy and fast, facilitating changes of keys as frequently as required,
and fast algorithms for polynomial multiplication and modular arithmetic
[[7] and [40]], whenever appropriate, can be adapted in the encryption and
decryption algorithms.
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